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FIXING WHAT WAS NOT BROKEN: A FUTURE FOR FIRES
We must return 'back to the basics' to prepare new soldiers, maintain our core competencies as field artilleryman, and develop young leaders. The FA branch along with the Fires Center of Excellence is committed to maintaining our exceptional force and advancing the force of tomorrow, through basic principles, new learning concepts and adaptability to the changing joint fight.
-BG Thomas Vandal Commandant, FCOE
Today, the United States and its partners find themselves competing for global influence in an era in which they are unlikely to be fully at war or fully at peace. "As we look to the future, our Army faces a complex and uncertain environment that will challenge our soldiers, leaders, and organizations in many ways." 2 The challenge is to prepare for this unknown hybrid threat in order to protect U.S. vital national interests.
The most sensitive instrument of national power used to achieve national objectives is the Military. The critical missions the Nation deems a priority, will be carried out by our Service men and women at home and abroad. Therefore, it is up to the Nation and its military leaders to effectively lead and resource its military force, setting the conditions to achieve those missions set before them. To this end, the Fires community must address what requirements and capabilities should exist to face the future fight. As the Nation begins to close out operations in Afghanistan over the next couple of years, the Field Artillery (FA) branch needs to anticipate future requirements and ways in which to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the branch. Considering the fiscally demanding environment that currently exists, previous predictions and future programs and force design approved years ago, must be readdressed. Existing issues, if not appropriately readdressed to account for changes in the operating environment as well as lessons learned from over ten years of war and six years of modularity, could have strategic implications for the future fighting force in terms of force structure, design, and capabilities. In particular, the low core competency level of artilleryman is a result of Modularity, the Army's transformation concept of moving away from a division-centric task organized force towards a much smaller, modular brigade-centric force that is selfcontained, expeditionary in nature and capable of supporting contingencies across the full spectrum of operations. Another cause of their low competency level has been several years of persistent conflict in which artilleryman often were required to execute non-standard missions in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which continues to persist. Additionally, the effective employment of precision guided munitions (PGM) during this same time frame, has created a thought process that the utility of mass quantities of conventional munitions in future conflicts, is no longer required. Consequently, there may be a false sense of security that precision guided munitions will always achieve the desired effect at a lower financial cost and reduced logistical burden. However, better understanding U.S. military capabilities and its reliance on technology, U.S. adversaries will undoubtedly seek alternative methods to disrupt or deny effective application of certain systems. For example, U.S adversaries could attack satellites rendering global positioning system (GPS) munitions useless, thus requiring once again, the reliance on conventional munitions as a part of degraded operations. In light of these issues, the purpose of this paper focuses on two areas that must be readdressed; fire support training and organization and the role of conventional artillery munitions as part of the future force. These issues affect the entire Army and must be addressed in a responsible manner now in order to plan for tomorrow and the future of Fires.
Background
The Army's ability to effectively leverage innovation and change has made a tremendous impact on the way in which it has fought throughout history. During the inter war years of World War I and World War II, postwar boards convened to capture lessons learned to improve the effectiveness of combined arms operations. 3 During this time, it was determined that the need to control indirect fires was required resulting in the creation of the artillery observer. Few envisioned how useful the artillery forward observer (FO) would become until he was used in combat for the first time. What resulted was a system that worked so well, the supporting artillery became regarded as a "utility." "A quick call by a forward observer over a field radio summoned a barrage of artillery shells that could quickly eliminate an enemy outpost or formation and allow infantrymen to proceed without harm, much like turning on the water to put out a fire".
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The forward observer has repeatedly demonstrated his influence as a lethal contributor to the combined arms fight. Capable of coordinating large amounts of fire power through the employment of mortars, cannon and rocket artillery, integrating Close Air Support (CAS), and coordination of attack aviation; in one short radio transmission, conditions can change instantly. His responsibility is immense and much is expected of the forward observer.
During the Korean War, the forward observer was indispensible. With Korea's rolling hills and valleys, high-peaked mountains and large irrigated farming areas, the forward observer was relied on to mitigate the effects of terrain and to set the conditions for offensive and defensive operations. Serving in a dangerous profession, the observer was positioned forward with the infantry, often in contact, and a sought after target of the enemy in his static observation post (OP). A skilled forward observer was a combat multiplier. Ralph Carver a former infantry platoon sergeant during World War II, notes "it did not take long to realize the importance of coordination with artillery. Most of us, at one time or another, probably owed our lives to artillery support…they shared our wet, muddy foxholes, our misery, our fears, and the courage it often took to just keep going.
The FO teams along with the medics, soon had the respect and highest regard of the recommendations to fix problems that existed. In his assessment, MG Vangjel described how lethal skills had atrophied due to persistent conflict, modularity, and the expansion of skill sets. The combination of these changes had an accumulative effect.
Additionally, the demand for Field Artillery units and soldiers to perform both 'nonstandard' as well as FA core competency missions had increased and over time core field artillery competencies had expanded to include non-lethal targeting, information operations, and company intelligence fusion. Additionally, MG Vangjel described how Division FSCOORDs were witnessing the degradation of fire support skills but had little authority to assist and scarce resources. 14 Understandably, some may argue this approach to fixing the problem, is not the right solution.
The field artillery branch should brace for a negative reaction from some maneuver commanders. In a negative response to the FCoE's FDU proposal, Brigade commanders in disagreement with the FDU have concurred that consolidated FIST training and certification run by the FA commander will suffice. One Brigade commander described mitigating personnel issues through the execution of this "theory". Another commander stated, "the idea behind modularity was to task organize into teams at the BCT and Bn level -this COA tears at this team concept." 20 Although the concept they describe is sound, the reality is, every commander will execute that concept differently, with different standards, priorities, and results. By assuming that there will be consistency across the Army only lends to the marginal performance commanders Operational adaptable fires provide the Army with versatile capabilities to respond to a uncertainty and complexity; enable the defeat of a wide range of threats; provide timely and responsive fires in environmental and operational conditions; provide a range of precision to conventional scalable capabilities to engage ground targets and aerial threats, prevent fratricide and minimize collateral damage; provide access to and integrate joint, Army, and multifunctional fire capabilities at the lowest appropriate levels. One of the core strengths of the field artillery has always been its ability to mass fires. However, as was the case after the Korean War, the desire for a smaller force structure with increased mobility and survivability over mass became the priority. During the Korean War it was believed that our nuclear arsenal weapons would compensate for the inability to mass conventional weapons as effectively -resulting from in a decrease in the number of weapon systems. A 280mm cannon was initially redesigned specifically to deliver a tactical nuclear warhead before conventional artillery cannons possessed the capability. As an interim measure in adapting to a nuclear battlefield, in
1956, a reorganization of division artillery referred to as Reorganization of Current
Infantry Division (ROCID) took place in order to meet the demand for a smaller force while simultaneously maintaining the capability to support the Division in a nuclear fight. 24 "Following two years of evaluation, major modifications were made in the ROCID division. The principle changes in the division artillery were designed to provide a substantial increase in conventional firepower and to centralize artillery fire support." Conventional ammunition remains in the current inventory because there has and always will be a use for it in mass quantities in the future despite how expensive it may be. In a brief to the CG of Fort Benning and commandant of the MCoE, the Commandant of the FCoE described to them how artillery battalions have lost the ability to mass fires and are challenged with the employment of precision munitions and achieving consistent accuracy with conventional munitions. 27 The fact that he highlighted these issues, indicates the importance he put on these critical tasks.
Cost Savings
The Army can be described as an institution that is reliant or focused on effectiveness and less on efficiency, and for good reason. We do not want leaders making tactical decisions based on the financial constraints that realistically do not exist in a combat environment. Yet there are some who believe that, in the long term, precision guided munitions will increase cost savings because fewer rounds will have to be delivered to destroy a specific target. Author Major J. Christopher Lewis in an article titled The Future Artillery Force…Today: On-the Horizon Changes for Artillery described the potential cost savings of precision guided munitions stating, "armed with precision munitions, three rounds may be fired in place of massed battalion fires providing a more cost-effective method of destroying the target." 28 Although this may be true, it is not the cost savings that should be the consideration, but the effect that one round will achieve.
The reality is, precision munitions like Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)
and EXCALIBUR are expensive and in short supply. Constraints are placed on their employment and rarely if at all, can you obtain them during training. When considering basic economics and supply and demand, if the demand does not exist, supply will not follow. Currently the high demand for precision munitions does not exist because they are not being used at high rates due to short supply or tight restrictions as to who can approve their delivery and at what types of targets they can engage. The current operational environment has taught commanders to rely on precision guided munitions to attack High Value Targets (HVT) or targets where collateral damage is a concern.
However, precision guided munitions are costly and will be employed judiciously. Until the supply of precision munitions increases, the perception of low demand will always exist.
Logistical Consideration
Arguably precision munitions will reduce logistical requirements. The more accurate the round, the fewer rounds required to achieve a desired effect on the target.
The assumption that must be made in this argument is that the number of targets will be limited, otherwise a logistical strain, may in fact exist. Training and Doctrine Command
Pamphlet 525-3-4 briefly describes this concept stating, "near precision and precision capabilities reduce the number of munitions required to achieve the required effects, making indirect fires more efficient, and thereby reducing Class V sustain demands." The goal is to always achieve effectiveness, not efficiency. As our adversaries adapt to our methods of attacking them, they will surely understand there is a need to adapt their force protection methods.
In an article written shortly after the Crusader cannon program was eliminated, Whiteside argues that the bomb capable of being put through a window will have a limited effect on a large concentration of enemy troops. 34 The last two conflicts with Iraq has proven the utility of precision munitions, the next one may not.
Afghanistan and Beyond
In the January 2012 Fires Journal article, the author Gene Meredith briefly described the success U.S. Marines have achieved in Regional Command-South (RC-S) employing EXCALIBUR. However, in RC-E, the Army shot 22 times the total number of rounds than the Marines in RC-S. 35 Despite the differences in the two operating environments in these two regional commands, the requirement for both precision and conventional munitions existed in varying degrees.
The reliance on technical solutions to military problems is potentially problematic in future fights. The United States' adversaries will undoubtedly attempt to attack satellite based systems thereby degrading the capability to utilize equipment and munitions reliant on GPS (Global Positioning System). An adversary may conduct electronic attack and jamming operations to degrade U.S. military capabilities. Whether an attack on satellites has a short-term or long-term effect, the ability to conduct degraded operations will quickly become necessary in order to maintain an advantage and deny the enemy the ability to achieve strategic or tactical success. In this type of operating environment, field artillery units will be expected to maintain and sustain their arsenal of conventional ammunition. More importantly they will be required to operate their GPS aided equipment in a degraded mode as well.
In the January 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept, the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) described future threats that include advanced long-range weapons designed to keep forces away and short-range arms designed to limit freedom of action. The concept's focus is on anti-access and area-denial threats. "Establishing operational access may require forcible entry, the projection of land forces onto hostile territory in the face of armed opposition". 36 This threat could easily be interpreted as a well defended threat. A threat that will be effectively addressed in a lethal nature with a combined arms operation incorporating well trained forward observers employing precision and conventional indirect fire munitions. Second, the Army must continue to train all artilleryman on the employment of conventional artillery and mortar munitions in addition to retaining a balance in its conventional and precision arsenal. With that, continue to leverage technology to increase the lethality of conventional munitions, (ie. Precision Guided Kits for ballistic projectiles). In a fiscally constrained environment as the Army operates in today, establishing priorities and assuming risk is essential to managing diminishing resources.
The future is unpredictable despite the United States Government 's (USG) best efforts to anticipate the next threat. What is predictable is that the USG's strategic goals and objectives will be challenged in ways that may require military intervention and the use of conventional munitions as has been the case in every major conflict since World War I. In the end, it will be the effectiveness, not the efficiency that will make the difference in achieving the Nations strategic aims. The ability to mass batteries and battalions is a lost art, a direct reflection on the way in which artillery has been fought in support of counter insurgency operations over the last several years. Engaging the future threat may require the massing of artillery units to achieve a desired effect, an effect that may require large amounts of ammunition. This was a basic evaluated task mastered by artillerymen in years past and must be mastered once again.
"As BCT commanders, we were fortunate to have FA battalion commanders who grew up under the old system and were tactically and technically superb. We had the best of both worlds -highly trained artillery that was fully integrated into our BCTs." artilleryman has adapted to an ever changing environment and threat, threats that have also adapted in that very same environment. One can expect a continued evolution but should not shelve forever, the very things that facilitated success-brilliance at the basics. Allowing technology to outdistance basic tactics, techniques, and procedures, is a dangerous dynamic. Facing uncertainty and change in the future will require an understanding of the basics no matter what operational environment exists. If the issues in this paper are not properly addressed now, the Army will once again put soldiers and the mission at risk.
